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1.   In the course of a commentary on Nelson Goodman’s Ways of 
Worldmaking, Carl G. Hempel formulated a problem for physicalism that 
has come to be known as “Hempel’s Dilemma”.  He wrote: 
 
I would add that the physicalist claim that the language of 
physics can serve as unitary language of science is inherently 
obscure:  the language of what physics is meant?  Surely not that 
of, say, eighteenth-century physics; for it contains terms like 
‘caloric fluid’, whose use is governed by theoretical assumptions 
now thought false.  Nor can the language of contemporary 
physics claim the role of unitary language, since it will no doubt 
undergo further changes too.  The thesis of physicalism would 
seem to require a language in which a true theory of all physical 
phenomena can be formulated.  But it is quite unclear what is to 
be understood here by a physical phenomenon, especially in the 
context of a doctrine that has taken a decidedly linguistic turn. 
(Hempel, 1980: 194-5. See also Hempel 1969) 
 
Hempel here was contrasting Goodman’s position with that of Otto 
Neurath, the member of the Vienna Circle most responsible for formulating 
and promoting the thesis of physicalism (see Neurath 1931a, 1931b).  For 
Neurath, or anyway for Neurath as interpreted by Hempel (see Hempel 
1949), physicalism was the linguistic doctrine that every statement is 
equivalent in meaning to—i.e. is synonymous with—some physical 
statement. And, on its face, Hempel’s point is limited to a criticism of 
physicalists of Neurath’s type. But of course few if any physicalists are of 
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that type now.  Nowadays, physicalism is the metaphysical doctrine that, 
not necessarily but as a matter of fact, every instantiated property is 
necessitated by, or supervenes on, some physical instantiated property.1 So 
it might appear that, even if Hempel is right about the inherent obscurity of 
Neurath’s physicalism, this is not something with which a contemporary 
physicalist need be overly concerned. 
For most writers on this issue, however, the problem Hempel is 
posing is a problem not simply for a linguistic version of physicalism but 
for the metaphysical version as well. Geoffrey Hellman, for example, 
writing a few years after Hempel, describes it as “perhaps the most serious 
objection to all efforts in formulating physicalism”, and formulates it in the 
following influential and often-quoted passage: 
 
…current physics is surely incomplete (even in its ontology) as 
well as inaccurate (in its laws).  This poses a dilemma: either 
physicalist principles are based on current physics, in which case 
there is every reason to think they are false; or else they are not, 
in which case it is, at best, difficult to interpret them, since they 
are based on a “physics” that does not exist—yet we lack any 
general criterion of “physical object, property, or law” framed 
independently of physical theory. (Hellman, 1985: 609). 
 
Moreover, in supposing that the problem is a problem for physicalists in 
general, Hellman has been followed by many others.  Hempel’s dilemma 
has become, as Jeffrey Poland puts it, the (1993; XX) “the stock objection” 
to the idea that physicalism admits of a clear formulation.  
What should we say about the stock objection?  My answer will be 
that Hempel’s dilemma is fallacious because its main disjunctive premise is 
false.  So far as I can determine, to the extent that standard discussions of 
the dilemma focus attention on this premise at all, it seems to be assumed 
that it is an obvious or even a logical truth—in Hellman’s words, “either 
                                                 
1 Of course, there is a very large philosophical literature on what it means to say one fact 
or set of facts supervenes on or entails another, but I will operate here with a rough and 
ready.  That should be enough for our purposes.   
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physicalist principles are based on current physics…or else they are not”.  
However, far from being an obvious or logical truth, the disjunctive 
premise is, at least when properly understood, a substantial falsehood.  
Once the premise is rejected, as I think it should be, we are faced with a 
number of difficult problems about the concept of the physical; but one 
problem we are not faced with is Hempel’s dilemma. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In §2 I set out what I take 
Hempel’s dilemma to be.  In §§3-6, I develop and defend my objection. In 
§§7-8, I compare this objection with two others. I end the paper, in §9, by 
briefly examining the motivation that Hempel himself offered for 
formulating his dilemma, a motivation that lies in ideas about philosophical 
methodology associated with the so-called linguistic turn. 
 
2. We have so far talked informally about Hempel’s dilemma—what 
is it exactly?  No doubt the precise formulation is a matter of debate, but in 
my view it is reasonable to work with the following version of the 
argument: 
 
H1. If physical properties are by definition the properties 
expressed by the predicates of a current physical theory, 
physicalism is false. 
H2. If physical properties are by definition the properties 
expressed by the predicates of an ideal physical theory, we 
don’t know what physicalism says. 
H3. Either it is the case that physical properties are by definition 
the properties expressed by predicates of a current physical 
theory that is current, or it is the case that physical 
properties are by definition the properties expressed by 
predicates of an ideal physical theory. 
HC.  Ergo, either physicalism is false or we don’t know what it 
says. 
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Understood this way, Hempel’s dilemma is a valid argument for a prima 
facie significant conclusion.   What reasons are there for the premises?  I 
will address this question by focussing on each premise in turn.  
 
2.1.  Support for H1. 
We may think of a physical theory as a theory that aims to provide a 
complete inventory of the properties and relations required in the 
explanation of ordinary physical objects and related phenomena.  But 
surely current physics does not provide a complete inventory.  That is, 
surely we are in the midst of an on-going investigation, rather than being at 
the end or close to the end of the investigation. On the other hand, if 
current physics is indeed incomplete, presumably there is a possible future 
physical theory that is complete, or at least is more complete that current 
physics is.  Let us now imagine such a theory, and in particular imagine 
that a predicate of such a theory expresses a property—call it “F.”  If 
physical properties are by definition those that are expressed by the 
predicates of current physical theory, F is not physical. This is not say that 
F is spooky or ethereal, nor that F conforms to any paradigm we might 
have of what a non-physical property is; in fact, since we have no idea 
what F is, F conforms to no paradigm at all.  It is just to say that if physical 
properties are by definition contemporary physical properties, F is not 
physical. 
Now, that F is not physical is not by itself a problem for 
physicalism.  The beauty of Venice is a property of Venice, but not a 
physical property of Venice.  But that is no problem for physicalism, for 
physicalism is not the thesis that every property is a physical property.  It is 
rather the thesis that every instantiated property is necessitated by some 
instantiated physical property—and this formulation permits the 
instantiation of some non-physical properties. However, while F’s not 
being physical is not by itself a problem for physicalism, there is a related 
consideration that is.  For not only is F not physical; it is also not 
necessitated by any physical property. For consider:  F was introduced as a 
property not on the list of properties given by current physics. But ‘not 
being on the list’ in the relevant sense, means, I take it, not only ‘is 
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numerically distinct from’ but also ‘is not necessitated by’ any property on 
that list.   But now it does indeed follow that physicalism is false: F is 
property that is neither physical nor entailed by anything physical; 
physicalism entails that there is no such property.  
In sum the reason for H1 is that current physics is incomplete.  If 
current physics is incomplete, then, if physical properties are by definition 
those expressed by contemporary physics, physicalism is false.  
 
2.2.  Support for H2. 
Suppose that the Peircean limit of inquiry is reached at C.O.B. on 
November 5th, 3027.  Presumably the scientists leaving work on that fateful 
day—of course they may not know that the day in question is the fateful 
one—will have formulated some physical theory, and the theory in 
question will say at least that there are various properties, let us call them 
‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’, which do various things.   If physical properties are by 
definition the properties expressed by the predicates of this ideal physics, 
then the physical properties are F, G, and H.  Similarly, if physical 
properties are by definition the properties expressed by the predicates of 
ideal physics, then physicalism tells us that F, G and H entail every other 
(instantiated) property, either singly or in combination. But what then does 
physicalism say?  For those of us who are not at the Peircian limit the 
answer seems to be that we have no idea. Physicalism says that every 
property supervenes on some complex of F, G and H.  But since we don’t 
know what F, G and H are, we don’t know what physicalism says.  Of 
course we can in a sense name these properties and refer to them; I have 
just done so at least schematically.  But naming is different from knowing.   
Even if we can name the properties, we still don’t know what they are, and 
nor do we know what physicalism says.  In effect, we are like the people in 
Gareth Evans example who can refer to Julius as ‘the actual inventor of the 
zip’, but do not know who Julius is (Evans 1983; see also Stalnaker 2004).   
Suppose then we don’t know what physicalism says—what 
follows?  Well, if we do not know what it says, we are in no position to 
know it, no position to deny it, no position to believe or disbelieve it with 
justification.  Nor are we even in a position to speculate about whether it is 
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true.  In fact the whole project of rationally assessing physicalism—
providing reasons for and against it, declaring oneself for it or against it, 
saying it is a good bet at least in the long run—seems to presuppose that 
we know what it is, at least in outline.   But if that presupposition is false, 
physicalism is unworthy of assessment.  
In sum the reason for H2 is that, in view of the incompleteness of 
current physics, we don’t know what an ideal physics says.  If we don’t 
know what ideal physics says, then, if physical properties are by definition 
the properties expressed by the predicates of ideal physics, we don’t know 
what physicalism says.  
 
2.3.  Support for H3. 
H1 says that if physical properties are defined one way, something bad 
happens, and H2 tells us that if physical properties are defined some other 
way, something different but also bad happens.  H3 tells us that these 
methods of definition exhaust the field: either physical properties are 
defined in terms of a theory that is current or they are defined in terms of a 
theory that is ideal.   
 Why believe H3?  Later on in our discussion we will discuss 
Hempel’s motivation for H3.  If H3 is false, as I think it is, this motivation 
must be less persuasive than Hempel, at least, thought it was, and I think 
that an analysis of it bears this out.  For the moment, however, I will 
content myself with making two points about the case for H3.  The first is 
that, while it is true that we may extract from Hempel’s discussion a 
consideration in favor of H3, in point of fact most contributions to this 
debate fail outright to provide such considerations, and pass over this part 
of the argument without comment.   As I noted before, many people seem 
to think H3 is just obvious.2   
                                                 
2 Evidence for this claim derives in part from the fact that the standard responses to the 
dilemma assume that H3 is true.  For example:  one group of philosophers, such as Mellor 
(1973; see also Crane and Mellor 1990) and Daly (1998), takes the dilemma to establish 
what it purports to, viz., that physicalism has no true formulation that is worthy of 
assessment, and draws the moral that discussions of physicalism in philosophy of mind 
that concern the doctrine are without point or incoherent.  Another group, such as Melnyk 
(1997, 2001) and Hellman (1985) himself, agrees that the dilemma establishes what it 
purports to, but draws a different moral, namely that physicalism can be philosophically 
significant even if false.  A third group, such as Smart (1978) and Ravenscroft (1997), 
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 Why do people think that it is just obvious?  I am not sure.  
However, as I mentioned at the outset, it may be that they confuse it with a 
logical truth.  One possibility is that they confuse H3 with the truth that 
physics is either current or it is not. But this can hardly be the premise that 
is in operation in Hempel’s dilemma, if only because it says nothing about 
how physical properties are to be defined.   
A more likely possibility is that H3 is being confused with H3*: 
 
H3* Either it is the case that physical properties are by definition 
the properties expressed by predicates of physical theory 
that is current, or it is the not case that physical properties 
are by definition the properties expressed by the predicates 
is current. 
 
But again it is implausible that this is the main premise of Hempel’s 
dilemma.  If this were the disjunctive premise of Hempel’s dilemma, the 
second premise would have to be, correlatively, this: 
 
H2* If it is not the case that physical properties are by definition 
the properties expressed by the predicates of a current 
physical theory, we don’t know what physicalism says. 
 
But we have no reason for believing H2*!  In particular, the reason we had 
for believing H2 is not likewise a reason for believing H2*.  The reason for 
believing H2 was that we did not know what ideal physics says.  But we 
know perfectly well what various non-current physical theories say, and so 
we know perfectly well what various versions of physicalism say if they 
are defined with reference to those theories. (We know perfectly well what 
                                                                                                                          
denies that the dilemma establishes its conclusion, arguing either that contemporary or 
near contemporary physics is in fact true, or at any rate true as far as philosophy of mind 
goes. And fourth group, such as Poland (1994), Wilson (2005) and Dowell (2005), agrees 
that the dilemma does not establish its conclusion but argue instead that a version of 
physicalism based on some ideal or future physics may, contra the dilemma, be worthy of 
assessment after all.  These proposals all raise interesting issues on their own terms but 
what they all share is the tendency to agree with H3.   
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physicalism says if it is defined with reference to the physics of the 
nineteenth century, for example.)  What this suggests is that in order to 
formulate Hempel’s dilemma we need to operate with a contrast between 
the physical theory that we currently adopt, on the one hand, and the 
physical theory that will be true in the ideal limit, on the other.  But then it 
would seem that in order to formulate Hempel’s dilemma, we need H3 and 
not H3*.  
 The possibilities about why people think H3 is obvious that I have 
just mentioned are speculative; as I said, I don’t know why people think 
this.  But in any case—and this is the second of the two points I said I want 
to make about H3—they are wrong if they do. H3 is a substantial, and so 
not an obvious, claim. In particular, H3 might be false in either of two 
ways. First, it could be that physical properties are not defined by a 
physical theory at all.  Second, it could be that, even if physical properties 
were defined by a physical theory, they would not defined by one that is 
either current or ideal.  
 
3.  So far I have set out Hempel’s dilemma and said something about 
the plausibility of its premises.  Turning now to criticism, my own focus—
as I have indicated—will be on the disjunctive premise of the argument, 
viz.  
 
H3. Either it is the case that physical properties are by definition 
the properties expressed by predicates of physical theory 
that is current, or it is the case that physical properties are by 
definition the properties expressed by the predicates of a 
physical theory that is ideal. 
 
But why is H3 false?  Well let us focus first on a very simple version of a 
view about physical properties—we may call it ‘the theory view’—that is 
suggested by the first disjunct of this premise: 
 
(1) F is a physical property if and only if F is property expressed by 
a predicate of a current physical theory. 
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It is a very easy to find counterexamples to (1).  Thus, consider impetus, 
the property attributed to physical objects by medieval impetus physics. 
Impetus, or having impetus, is not a property expressed by a predicate of a 
current physical theory.  Yet having impetus is a physical property.  Hence 
(1) is false.3 
Is this just the first premise of Hempel’s dilemma all over again? 
Not so, for imagine replacing (1) with (2): 
 
(2) F is a physical property if and only if F is expressed by a 
predicate of an (the?) ideal physical theory. 
 
On the assumption—which I will adopt—that the ideal physical theory is a 
true physical theory, the example of impetus refutes (2) as a definition of 
what it is to be a physical property just as surely as it refutes (1).  For, 
while the true physical theory will tell us which physical properties are 
instantiated, and what they do, it will not tell us about impetus for the 
simple reason that impetus is not instantiated. Hence impetus is not a 
physical property by this definition. 
It might be objected that (as we indicated before) we have no idea 
what ideal physics says.  If so we are in no position to say that it will not 
mention impetus—maybe impetus is mentioned in ideal physics after all!   
But this objection doesn’t get to heart of the matter, as so far developed.  
                                                 
3 The notion of impetus was expressed by the medieval philosopher and scientist, Jean 
Buridan.  He wrote: "A mover, while moving a body, impresses on it a certain impetus, a 
certain power capable of moving this body in the direction in which the mover set it 
going, whether upwards, downwards, sideways or in a circle. By the same amount that the 
mover moves the same body swiftly, by that amount is the impetus that is impressed on it  
powerful. It is by this impetus that the stone is moved after the thrower ceases to move it; 
but because of the resistance of the air and the gravity of the stone, which inclines it to 
move in a direction opposite to that towards which the impetus tends to move it,this 
impetus is continually weakened. Therefore the movement of the stone will become 
continually slower, and at length, the impetus is so diminished or destroyed that the 
gravity of the stone prevails over it and moves the stone down towards its natural place." 
(A. C. Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, MA, 
1963), Vol.II. p.67.) The concept of impetus has also been of interest to developmental 
psychologists, some of whom suggest that common sense physics conforms to the 
principles of impetus physics.  See e.g. McCloskey 1983. Construed as a counterexample 
to proposals about how to define physical properties impetus is mentioned but not 
developed in my 2001a, 2001b. 
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The heart of the matter as so far developed is that any true physical theory 
will tell us only about the physical properties that happen to be instantiated 
at this world.  But it is very plausible that there are physical properties that 
are not instantiated at this world; impetus is my example of such a 
property, but any property like this will do.  On the other hand, if there are 
physical properties not instantiated in the actual world, then (2) is false.  
Another way to put the point is to say that presumably the ideal theory will 
rule out any false theory.  But properties postulated by false physical 
theories are nevertheless physical.  So an ideal physical theory will not tell 
us what it is for a property to be physical.    
The impetus example tells us that (1) and (2) are both false.  But it 
also tells us something very important about Hempel’s dilemma, viz., that 
its third premise, H3, is false. For consider: H3 tells us that physical 
properties are by definition those expressed by the predicates of current 
physics or ideal physics; in effect, H3 is just the disjunction of (1) and (2).  
But we have already seen that both (1) and (2) are false; hence H3 is false 
too. So impetus tells us not only that (1) and (2) are false.  It tells us also 
that H3 is false and that Hempel’s dilemma as stated collapses. 
 
4.    I have argued by counterexample that H3 is false, and in consequence 
that Hempel’s dilemma collapses.  But arguments by counterexample only 
go so far, and you may already have thought of ways to respond.   I will 
come back to some of these ways in a moment, but first I want to point out 
that, when we reflect on why the impetus case is persuasive, it emerges that 
our dispute with H3 concerns an issue of principle, and not simply an issue 
of how to respond to one example. 
The persuasiveness of the impetus example is due, I think, to an 
unclarity in the theory view I have so far been ignoring.  The unclarity has 
to do with what is meant by ‘physical theory’.  On the one hand, when one 
speaks of ‘physical theory’ one might have in mind a particular physical 
theory, such as medieval impetus physics, or Einstein’s theory of gravity, 
or that physical theory, whatever it is, that scientists will formulate in the 
Peircian limit.  On the other hand, when one speaks of ‘physical theory’ 
one might have in mind a kind of theory of which each of these particular 
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theories are instances.  So, in particular, one might think of a ‘physical 
theory’ as a theory of a certain general kind, say distinguished by its 
subject matter.  One might distinguish here between theory-types and 
theory-tokens, but the phrase ‘theory-token’ I find grating, so I will speak 
instead about individual theories versus kinds of theories.  
Now, what interpretation of the phrase ‘physical theory’ is at issue 
in Hempel’s dilemma?  It seems clear that what is intended is the idea of a 
particular physical theory.  Hempel asks “the language of what physics is 
meant?” and he clearly means to be asking: language of what particular 
physics is meant?  Similarly, H3 says that physical properties must be 
defined either in terms of one particular physical theory—viz., current 
physics—or another particular physical theory—viz.ideal physics. In short, 
Hempel’s dilemma tacitly assumes that by ‘physical theory’ one means 
‘particular physical theory’, and so far we have taken over this assumption 
uncritically.   
However, on reflection this assumption is false, and it is impossible 
that the notion of a physical property might be defined in terms of any 
particular physical theory.  For suppose you pick some particular theory, T, 
and say, “the physical properties are by definition the properties expressed 
by T”.  It should be clear that there will always be some other particular 
theory T*, and if that other theory is similarly a physical theory, then the 
properties that are expressed by this other theory will also be physical.  
Hence one’s purported definition will fail.  It is this fact, I think, that 
explains why the impetus example works.  Both current physics and ideal 
physics are two particular physical theories; impetus physics is another.  If 
you define the physical properties by reference to current physics, then the 
existence of impetus physics will refute you.  More generally, if you define 
physical properties by reference to any particular physical theory, the 
existence of other particular physical theories will refute you. But since, for 
any particular physical theory, there will always be another possible 
physical theory, no version of the theory view founded on particular 
theories will be true. 
How might this conclusion be avoided? If the argument will be 
replicated no matter what particular physical theory you pick, the only 
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response that is plausible at this point is to abandon particular physical 
theories for kinds of theory.  But this means in turn that the only version of 
the theory view that has a chance of being true is the one that defines 
physical properties in terms of a theory of a certain kind, i.e. the physical 
kind.  But in turn, if this is right, we arrive again at the conclusion that H3 
is false.  The problem with H3 is that it presupposes a version of the theory 
view that tries to define physical properties in terms of particular physical 
theories.  Since that presupposition is false so too is H3; and if H3 is false, 
and Hempel’s dilemma collapses. 
 
5. I have objected that any version of the theory view that defines 
physical properties in terms of a particular physical theory is false, and that 
in consequence Hempel’s dilemma, which presupposes such a theory, is 
unsound.  How might a proponent of the argument respond to this 
objection? 
One response starts from the point that I have not so far argued 
against any version of the theory view.  In particular, I have left open the 
idea that a version of the theory view defined in terms of a kind of theory 
might be true.  Might such a theory be exploited to resurrect Hempel’s 
Dilemma?   
The answer to this question is ‘no.’ The ‘kind of theory’ version of the 
theory view is, I take it, something like (3): 
 
(3) F is physical property if and only if F is expressed by a 
predicate of a theory of a certain kind, viz., the physical kind. 
 
An attractive feature of (3) is that it immediately avoids the impetus 
problem.  Having impetus might have failed to be expressed by any 
predicate of a particular theory, but it could not have failed to be express 
by a predicate of a theory of a certain kind, viz. physical theory. So 
impetus counts as physical by the lights of (3). 
 But while (3) avoids the impetus problem, it is no help to the 
would-be defender of Hempel’s dilemma.  Suppose a property is physical 
just in case it is expressed by a predicate of a theory of the physical kind.   
For Heather Dyke (ed.) From Truth to Reality.  Routledge, forthcoming 
 13 
It does not follow that a theory of that kind must be either current or ideal.  
An ideal theory means, in this context, the physical theory that turns out to 
be true in the actual world.  But this is a particular theory, not a kind of 
theory.  So we are no closer to a defense of H3 than we were before.   
Of course, one might point out that, in addition to being no help to 
the would-be defender of Hempel’s dilemma, (3) faces further problem. 
What is it for a theory to be of the physical kind? Take all the actual and 
possible theories that are physical; what is that they have in common in 
virtue of which they are physical? These are obviously exceedingly 
difficult questions—it is certainly not obvious what kind of theory a 
physical theory is.  But while this is a problem, it is a problem that I want 
to set aside here.  Whatever issues we confront when we confront the issue 
of explaining what kind of theory a physical theory is, Hempel’s dilemma 
will not be among them.  For Hempel’s problem starts from the assumption 
that you must employ one of two particular theories to define what it is to 
be a physical property.  My objection is precisely that this assumption is 
clearly no good. 
 
6. The first response to our objection to H3 is to appeal to a ‘kind of 
theory’ version of the theory view.  The second response points out that I 
have so far considered only very simplified versions of the ‘particular 
theory’ version of the theory view. Might not a more sophisticated version 
do better?  This is obviously a very natural thought. Its only problem is that 
when we examine what some of these more sophisticated versions of the 
theory view are, it becomes apparent that the basic problem remains 
untouched.  
The first alternative involves adjusting the theory view so that the 
primary idea concerns, not whether the theories in question are true, and 
not whether they are physical, but whether they have been formulated at 
some point in time:  
 
(4) F is a physical property if and only if F is expressed by a 
predicate of a formulated physical theory (that is a theory 
formulated at some point in the present, past or future). 
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This proposal does not face the impetus problem, for there is a formulated 
physical theory contains a predicate that expresses impetus, viz. impetus 
physics.   But a variant on our main example can be constructed to get 
around this. For take some property that we agree to be physical, say 
having a certain mass or impetus for that matter.  Suppose mass were not 
expressed by a predicate of formulated physical theory.  Would it still not 
have been physical?  For example, suppose that humans lost out in their 
competition with Neanderthals, and Neanderthals never developed sciences 
of their own.  Then mass would not have been expressed by a predicate of 
actual physical theory.  But surely having mass or impetus would 
nevertheless have been physical properties.  A scientist might say: “if the 
physical constants of the universe were different, life would not have 
evolved.”  For a philosopher to retort “the more different than you 
realize—for the constants would not even have been physical” is just silly, 
but that is what (4) commits one to.  
The second alternative is to adjust the theory view so that it 
involves, not simply what predicates are in fact contained in current 
physics, but what predicates might be defined in terms of those that are 
contained in current physics: 
 
(5) F is a physical property if and only if: either F is expressed by a 
predicate of current physical theory or F is expressed by a 
predicate definable in terms of the predicates of current physical 
theory. 
 
Like proposal (4), this avoids (or seems to) the impetus problem.  The 
predicate ‘has impetus’ is not a predicate of current physical theory, but 
perhaps it is definable in terms of those.  But nevertheless (5) does not get 
around the principled objection that the impetus problem brought to light.  
Unless every physical property is expressed by a predicate definable in 
terms of current predicates, there will always be a property like impetus.  
But it is implausible that this every physical property is so expressed—this 
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would entail, for example, that current physics is a universal theory in the 
sense that this theory has the expressive resources of any physical theory. 
 One might respond that while it is implausible that current physics is a 
universal theory in this sense, it is not implausible that ideal physics is such 
a theory; more generally, it is not implausible that there is a particular 
theory T which is such that T has the expressive power to capture every 
physical theory. However, there are two problems with this proposal.  In 
the first place, it seems to be to be extremely speculative to suppose that 
there is a physical theory like this—in particular, it does not follow from 
the fact that a theory is one we would adopt in the ideal limit that it is 
universal in this sense.4  In the second place, to argue in this way is in 
effect to reintroduce the idea of a kind of theory.  A physical theory is a 
kind of theory that translatable into T.  And, as we have said, if that is so, 
then we no longer have any reason to believe H3.  
The final alternative—I mention it mainly because it itself is so often 
mentioned in the literature—is to appeal to resemblance: 
 
(6) F is a physical property if and only if: either F is expressed by a 
predicate of current physical theory or F is sufficiently similar 
to a property expressed by a predicate of current physical 
theory. 
 
The problem with this view is it that it succeeds only by being overtly coy 
about what the dimensions of similarity are.  For example, is the property 
of having impetus sufficiently similar to the properties expressed by 
current physics to count or not?  If not, then impetus will refute (6) just as 
it did (1) and (2).  If so, then there is some dimension of similarity that ties 
current physical properties together with impetus.  But what could that 
dimension of similarity be? 
 
                                                 
4 In fact, I think it is can be shown that there is not physical theory like this, owing to the 
impact of twin-earth examples on the topic of what it is to be a physical theory.  But this 
point will have to be left to another occasion.  See my forthcoming and Susman 1981. 
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7.  Our objection to Hempel’s dilemma is that its third premise—H3—
presupposes a particular theory version of the theory view, and no such 
theory could possibly be true.  But the interest of this suggestion would be 
limited if there were any number of other reasons to resist the dilemma.  
Are there such reasons?  More generally, how does our objection compare 
with others in the literature? 
One objection is that Hempel’s dilemma is unsound because it fails 
to appreciate the sense in which the contemporary physicalist is a fallibilist 
in epistemology.  The fallibilist in epistemology holds that, at least for any 
empirical belief, the evidence that one has for the belief does not entail that 
the belief in question is true.  Fallibilists emphasize that at least in 
empirical matters, there is no certainty, no ruling out all possible 
alternatives.  And the contemporary physicalist certainly is by nature a 
fallibililist.  Indeed, the very idea that physicalism is kind of empirical, but 
abstract, hypothesis is suggestive of fallibilism.  
 However, while physicalists are fallibilists, what is the connection 
between fallibilism and Hempel’s dilemma?   Well, as we have seen, the 
reasoning in support of both H1 and H2 presupposes that contemporary 
physics is incomplete.  In the case of H1, the incompleteness of current 
physics supports the idea that if physicalism defined in terms of it, then 
physicalism is false.  In the case of H2, it supports the idea that we don’t 
know what an ideal physics will say.   But perhaps a physicalist could 
insist that, in their view, physics is complete—it is simply that, compatibly 
with what we know, it might not be complete. In sum, fallibilism permits 
one to respond to Hempel’s dilemma by denying the incompleteness of 
physics.  “It is not true that physics is incomplete,” you might say, “all that 
is true is that it might be; that is, it is consistent with our evidence that it 
is.”   
 Without further development, this response to Hempel’s dilemma is 
unsatisfactory.  It is true that both the completeness and the incompleteness 
of current physics are logically compatible with the truth of what physics 
tells us about the world now, and it is certainly true that physicalists are 
fallibilists and reasonably so.  However, this does not mean that it is 
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plausible to believe that current science is complete.  On the contrary, there 
seem a rather large number of reasons for supposing the opposite: 
 
• There may be cosmological reasons:  We may think of ourselves 
(or humans in general) as a occupying a very small pocket of the 
universe; it is amazing to think that cognitive mastery could be 
achieved from such a vantage point.   
• There may be evolutionary reasons:  We may think of ourselves (or 
humans in general) as evolved creatures whose cognitive capacities 
have been shaped by millions of years of evolution; surely in that 
case it is implausible that minds like ours could form a complete 
picture.  
• There may be psychological reasons:  We may think of our mind 
(or the human mind in general) as being subject to various kinds of 
barriers, constraints or filters; surely it is implausible that minds of 
our kinds are likely to know all sorts of facts.    
• There may be historical reasons: We may think that the science of 
our own day as like that of previous epochs in that it contains 
mistakes, confusions, wrong turns, approximations; the natural 
inference is that present circumstances are no different from 
previous circumstances in these respects, even if present science is 
better than, closer to the truth than, other sciences.   
• There may be methodological reasons: We may think that the 
practice of science or rational inquiry presupposes that he doesn’t 
know various types of facts; the very point of scientific inquiry 
seems to presuppose ignorance. 
  
In summary, while it is true that both the completeness and incompleteness 
of current physics are logically compatible with what science tells us about 
the world, it is not hard to motivate the hypothesis that current physics is 
indeed incomplete.  So appealing to fallibilism will not help the physicalist 
respond to Hempel’s dilemma. 
Of course, one might respond that, while these considerations are 
true enough in their way, they nevertheless do not actually entail that 
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current knowledge is incomplete; hence it remains open for an optimist to 
insist in the face of them that current physics is complete. But at this point 
the issue seems to degenerate into a stalemate between the optimist and the 
pessimist about current physics (and current science or knowledge more 
generally).  The optimist and the pessimist may agree about what is 
currently known, and may agree about all of the claims just reviewed.  And 
yet it may be the optimist thinks that current knowledge is complete (or 
very nearly so) while the pessimist thinks not.  
How do we decide this issue?  So far as I can see there is no way 
(or at any rate, no practical way) to resolve it, though on the other hand it 
seems clearly a dispute about a matter of fact.  If correct, that is an 
interesting observation that deserves further discussion.  But for the 
moment, the important thing is the connection between the unresolvability 
of this dispute and the fallibilist response to Hempel’s dilemma. In 
particular, it would appear that fallibilism not going to provide a successful 
response to Hempel’s dilemma, for the success of that response turns on an 
unresolvable dispute between the optimist and pessimist about current 
physics.  
 
8.    The fallibilist objection says that Hempel’s dilemma fails because, 
while it is possible that we have incomplete knowledge, in fact we have 
complete knowledge.   The other objection that I want to consider takes a 
different tack. We have seen the key observation in the dilemma is the 
incompleteness of current knowledge, and, that it is at least dialectically 
ineffective to deny this.  Nevertheless, it might be objected that even if we 
acknowledge that current physical theory is incomplete, the argument may 
be resisted.  “Sure, current physics is incomplete, and in consequence we 
don’t know exactly what the true physics will say,” the proponent of this 
objection will say, “but nevertheless we know enough to know that the true 
physics will not contain sui-generis psychological phenomena, and this is 
enough for the purposes of philosophy of mind.”  In sum, the main thrust 
of this objection is to accept Hempel’s dilemma but to de-fang it, arguing 
that the conclusion does not have the significance that many have 
supposed. 
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 What can we say about this objection?  To begin with the objection 
does contain an important insight. It is common to suppose that Hempel’s 
dilemma is significant because, if it were sound, many famous discussions 
in philosophy of mind would lose their rationale. For example, take the 
knowledge argument in philosophy of mind.  This is an argument to the 
conclusion that physicalism is false.  And people who debate the argument 
often describe themselves as ‘physicalists’ (if the don’t like the argument) 
or ‘anti-physicalists’ (if the do).  On the other hand, if Hempel’s dilemma 
is sound, the whole rationale of this discussion of the knowledge argument 
seems to have been removed.  If Hempel’s dilemma is sound, we know, 
and on grounds that have nothing to do with the knowledge argument, that 
physicalism is either false or unworthy of assessment.  What then would be 
the point of discussing whether some other argument establishes that it is 
false? 
However—and this is the insight embodied in the response to 
Hempel’s dilemma that we are now discussing—this reason for finding the 
dilemma significant is mistaken.  While it is true that discussions 
surrounding the knowledge argument go on in the name of physicalism, it 
is much less clear that this is essential to the enterprise. For the knowledge 
argument would if successful tell us not only that phenomenal facts—such 
as the fact that I have a pain in my toe—are not entailed by physical facts.  
It would tell us that this fact is not entailed by any fact that is not itself 
phenomenal fact; that is, it would tell us that phenomenal facts are not 
entails by any other facts. But if that is right, physicalism construed as a 
thesis about the world drops out of the picture. It doesn’t matter for the 
purposes of the knowledge argument whether the contrasting facts are 
physical or not; what matters is that they are not phenomenal.   If this is so, 
however, physicalism per se is inessential to the argument.  And that means 
that, even if Hempel’s dilemma were sound, it would have a very limited 
impact on arguments such as the knowledge argument.  
So there is an element of truth in this ‘know enough to know’ 
objection to Hempel’s dilemma.  Nevertheless it remains in my view 
unsuccessful as a response.  For the objection assumes that Hempel’s 
dilemma is significant, if it is, for one reason only, viz, because of its 
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impact or alleged impact on arguments in philosophy of mind such as the 
knowledge arguments.  However, while this is certainly one way in which 
Hempel’s dilemma is significant it is not the only way. In fact, the dilemma 
is incredible on its face (which is not to say that it might not be sound).  
Philosophers from Hobbes to Smart have endorsed physicalism; and 
philosophers from Descartes to C.D.Broad have denied it.  Surely it is 
incredible that these philosophers are as confused as they would have to be 
if the conclusion of Hempel’s dilemma were true.  In sum the reason for 
thinking that Hempel’s dilemma is significant (or at any rate of 
considerable interest), is this:  it is an apparently obvious fact from the 
history of philosophy that physicalism is a substantive doctrine; hence it is 
not the case that it is either false or we don’t know what it says.   
 
9. My assumption has been that Hempel’s dilemma is an argument 
from premises of the form ‘A v B’, ‘If A then C’, and ‘If A then D’ to a 
conclusion of the form ‘C v D’.  Focusing on this structure in turn focuses 
attention on the main disjunctive premise of the argument, and what I have 
been suggesting is that when we do focus on this premise it emerges that it 
is false and so that Hempel’s dilemma is unsound.  
But it is important to be aware of the limits of my discussion. I have 
said nothing about the truth (or falsity) of the conclusion—only that 
Hempel’s dilemma is not a good argument for that conclusion. And I have 
said nothing about what the correct view of physical properties or facts 
is—only that one can conclusively dispose of Hempel’s dilemma without 
doing so.   Rather than taking up these larger questions here, I will in this 
final section turn to Hempel’s own motivation for advancing the dilemma.   
A very common methodological move in twentieth century 
philosophy is the attempt to restate metaphysical issues as linguistic ones: 
to move, as Quine famously put it, from talk of miles to talk of ‘miles’.  In 
one way of looking at it, the theory view is precisely an instance of this 
strategy—for it trades in the question of what a physical property is for the 
question of what a physical theory or language is.  To the extent that we 
think of this strategy—Quine called it ‘semantic ascent’—as the method of 
clarification in philosophy, we will be friendly to the theory view.    
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It is this motivation that is most prominent in Hempel’s own 
discussion of the dilemma. The last sentence of the passage I began with he 
says: “it is quite unclear what is to be understood here by a physical 
phenomenon, especially in the context of a doctrine that has taken a 
decidedly linguistic turn.”  By ‘linguistic turn’ here, Hempel means, I 
think, exactly what Quine means by ‘semantic ascent.’  In fact, the role of 
semantic ascent in Hempel’s dilemma seems to me to be strangely 
unnoticed in the literature. It is often pointed out that the remark on 
Goodman continues a theme developed in a much longer paper, published 
10 years earlier; indeed the 1969 paper is often cited together with the 
comment on Goodman as the source of Hempel’s dilemma as discussed 
here. But it is almost never pointed out that, in that earlier paper, Hempel’s 
(1969, p. 180) stated goal is to “reflect on the rationale of this linguistic 
turn and to explore some of its implications for current problems in the 
theory of reduction”—the phrase ‘the linguistic turn’ here again is used by 
Hempel for Quine’s semantic ascent.  In fact, what he primarily refers to as 
a dilemma in that 1969 paper is not Hempel’s dilemma as discussed here 
but a larger dilemma that contains Hempel’s dilemma as a proper part.  The 
larger dilemma goes roughly as follows:  either we adopt the method of 
semantic ascent, and so adopt the theory view, or we do not.  If we do 
adopt it then we face what I have called here (following tradition) 
Hempel’s dilemma.  If we don’t adopt it, then, Hempel seems to suggest, 
we have no way to clarify metaphysical disputes about physicalism.  It is 
this second claim that provides a motivation for H3.  If the theory view is 
nothing less than the linguistic turn applied to the question of the physical, 
and if the linguistic turn is the method of philosophical clarification, then 
the thesis of physicalism will remain unclear unless and until we can bring 
to bear the linguistic techniques upon it. 
In my view it is doubtful that this larger dilemma is successful. For 
one thing, why view semantic ascent as the method of clarification in 
philosophy, as opposed to one of a whole barrage of methods of 
clarification and explanation? For another, Hempel seems to run together 
the idea that one might clarify a notion by switching focus to the language 
we use to express it with the quite different idea that we might explain a 
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notion in terms of the language we use to express it.  Nevertheless, while it 
might be that the larger dilemma Hempel offers us fails, there is in my 
view something right in the thrust of his thinking here, something that 
connects with our earlier discussion.   
For suppose you attempt to explain what a physical property is in 
terms of a physical theory or, following Hempel, a physical language. The 
language in question must be either a particular language or a kind of 
language.  Suppose that what you have in mind is a particular language.  
Then you will run into the problem I outlined earlier, namely that whatever 
particular physical language you pick, the existence of other particular 
physical languages will refute you. So suppose now that what you have in 
mind is a kind of language—a language of the physical kind.  As we saw 
before, the notion of a language (or theory) of the physical kind is 
somewhat obscure.  But it seems reasonable to say that, whatever precisely 
it is, a language will be of the physical kind just in case it can be used to 
talk about a particular subject matter, i.e. the physical.  (Similarly, a 
physical theory is a theory of a particular subject matter, i.e., the physical.)  
But now it is plain that, just as you can’t explain what a physical property 
is in terms of particular language, you can’t do so in terms of a kind of 
language either. For consider: if a language is one of the physical kind 
because it has a certain subject matter, you would need to identify that 
subject matter before you identify the kind of language in question.  But 
then one could not explain the subject matter in terms of the language in 
question; if anything, it is the other way around. The problem just outlined 
is close to both the versions of Hempel’s dilemma we have discussed in the 
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